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enough to correct the proofs and to inscribe presentation cards for the author's copies which he
instructed his publisher to send to his friends, among whom I was always proud to be counted.
Solly Zuckerman
RONALD L. NUMBERS and JUDITH WALZER LEAVITT (editors), Wisconsin medicine.
Historical perspectives, Madison and London, University ofWisconsin Press, 1981, 8vo, pp.
xi, 212, illus., $18.50.
This is a collection of eleven papers delivered at a bicentennial symposium in 1976.
Wisconsin, a State only since 1848, deserved such a study because it was not only typical for the
Mid-west, but a medical pioneer in many respects. Early medicine was, of course, rural and
dominated by malaria. Around 1900, the horse-and-buggy doctor began to be replaced by the
telephone-and-automobile doctor. Progress in surgery made practice shift towards hospitals,
and group practice began in 1916. The health problems of the cities were overcome by 1920. All
this and the subjects of medical sects, societies, and education are discussed in the eleven con-
tributions. The book is very well produced: use of sources, style, editing, bibliographies, index,
and illustrations. It is primarily a social history ofWisconsin medicine. This is not surprising, as
among the eleven authors is only one M.D. (six are graduate students); and impersonal social
history of medicine is fashionable. As I wrote one of the first monographs in the social history
ofmedicine fifty years ago, may I be allowed to plead for the rediscovery of the medical history
ofmedicine? It exists too.
Erwin H. Ackerknecht
Zurich
UFFE J. JENSEN and ROM HARRE (editors), The philosophy of evolution, Brighton,
Harvester Press, 1981, 8vo, pp. vii, 299, £22.50;.
Darwinism has been with us for over 120 years, and other forms ofevolutionism outstrip that
period. Ever since Darwin dispatched his Origin to John Murray, philosophers have speculated
about the range of phenomena which might be understood via an evolutionary perspective. Is
there some kind of analogue of Darwinian evolution by natural selection controlling social
change, for example? And, if so, then what are the analogues of mutation and selection? At a
more abstract level, it is tempting to suppose that changes over time in the corpus of scientific
knowledge (or belief) - changes like those involved in going from Copernicus to Kepler and
from Newton to Einstein - constitute a definite evolution towards higher levels not of fitness,
but of truth. Staying closer to Darwin, the philosopher sees that the basic model itself is not
unproblematical - that there are all sorts of difficulties surrounding the meaning of "natural
selection" and the question ofwhat are the very units ofselection. In other words, evolution pre-
sents philosophical issues at a variety of levels, and it is the merit ofthis book, based upon the
contributions to an Aarhus symposium, that it tackles all the levels.
The number ofessays (fifteen) and their diversity present a problem for the reviewer, but it is
worth mentioning the essay by David Hull on the units of evolution, which is timely given
Gould's recent reintroduction of the notion of species selection into evolutionary theory. Also
notable is Harr6's essay on the evolutionary analogy in social explanation, wherein he argues
that the social analogues of genes are social rules. He concludes that despite the pitfalls facing
anyone overlooking disanalogies between the social and the biological case, the use of the
mutation/selection model is ofvalue insofar as it allows the construction ofexplanations in the
social sphere which do not entail a positive causality between the environment and practices
adapted to it.
For the "pure" philosopher, the final section is the most exciting, comprising an essay by J.
Mittelstrasse, followed by a debate between Laurens Laudan and Bill Newton-Smith on the
thorny issue ofwhether, and, ifso, in what way, scientific change may be regarded as taking us
from a lesser to a greater truth. Laudan offers a "refutation ofconvergent realism" intended to
show that it is better to see science as progressing by maximizing its problem-solving capacity
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